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 1
1.  Introduction1
 
International Relations (IR) as an academic field studies the political interactions of 
states and other actors in the international arena such as international organizations, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational companies large and 
powerful enough to act as "global players." The political interactions that intrigue IR 
scholars include both peaceful cooperation and violent conflict. They may be rule-
governed and orderly, or they may defy any attempt to discover a pattern to which 
they obey. In terms of substance, they involve the consensual or contested creation, 
protection, and distribution of values encompassing such diverse assets as security, 
economic welfare, ecological stability, and human rights.  
 
IR is not only about international politics, however, but about foreign policy as well. 
While "international politics" denotes the complex, more or less structured, and more 
or less conflictual interplay of several international actors, "foreign policy" is 
predicated on a particular actor, usually a state or, more rarely, a union of states, 
referring to its endeavor to protect its interests and to promote its values vis-à-vis 
other actors beyond its borders. Obviously, foreign policy is not an activity separate 
from international politics: in a sense international politics is composed of the foreign 
policies of actors, and if actors somehow decided no longer to engage in foreign 
policy there would be no more international politics, either. However, foreign policy 
is distinguished from international politics in that it involves a particular perspective 
and an "author," i.e. we talk about the foreign policy of the United States, of Germany, 
of the European Union, etc..2 In short: foreign policy is about transboundary political 
action (how it comes about, how it is related to the action of others, etc.) rather than 
interaction. 
 
Students of international relations have come up with a range of theories about 
international politics. Some of these theories focus on a particular type of 
phenomenon such as war or international trade. Others are more ambitious and claim 
to shed light on the whole of international politics and to identify the factors that drive 
international political behavior in diverse issue areas (even as they do not and could 
                                                     
1The author gratefully acknowledges his intellectual indebtedness to members of the foreign policy 
analysis research team at the University of Tübingen and to Peter Mayer for his assistance in 
completing this text two years ago.  As the volume for which this text was prepared for as a chapter 
never got published, yet requests for citing of this text have continued to arrive, I felt it appropriate to 
publish this text albeit belatedly.  
2 It is an altogether different story whether or not we can meaningfully generalize over the foreign 
policies of different actors at different times and places. "Positivists" in the study of foreign policy 
argue that we can; "interpretivists" deny this possibility (Neufeld 1995; Nicholson 1996). The theories 
of foreign policy dealt with in this chapter rest on the assumption that the subject matter they seek to 
illuminate exhibits certain regularities and hence share a basically "positivist" epistemological 
outlook. Thus, the study of foreign policy lends itself to comparison across nations as well as across 
time. 
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not claim to provide explanations for every detail). Over the years, several such 
"grand theories" ("schools of thought," "paradigms") have emerged and compete for 
acceptance in the scientific community (Viotti and Kauppi 1998; Krell 2000; Baylis 
and Smith 2001:part Two; Carlsnaes et al. 2002:part One). In current IR discourse, the 
most visible and advanced general theories of international politics include 
neorealism, liberalism, and constructivism (Walt 1998). As we shall see shortly, each 
of these approaches offers its own key concepts, assumptions, and hypotheses in order 
to make sense of the myriad of interactions that constitute contemporary world 
politics. 
 
As we have noted, foreign policy is clearly and closely related to, though different 
from, international politics. Nevertheless, IR scholars have sometimes insisted that 
theories of international politics and theories of foreign policy are not only distinct, 
but unrelated – such that theorizing international politics produces few if any clues 
about the causes of foreign policy behavior. The most prominent and eloquent 
proponent of this view is Kenneth Waltz (1979; 1986), the leading figure of the 
neorealist school of thought. For Waltz, the central task of a theory of international 
politics is to work out the notion of an international system that cannot simply be 
equated to the "units" (in his case, states) that interact "in" that system. According to 
Waltz, the task is accomplished by defining the "structure" of this system in such a 
way as to make plain that there is more to it than could be rendered by a description of 
the actions, intentions, and other attributes of the states that comprise the system. For 
example, anarchy (i.e. the lack of an effective arbitrator of disputes in the international 
system) is an essentially structural feature that cannot be reduced to the properties of 
the actors struggling with the dangers and uncertainties that come with this feature. 
Due to this inherent "systemic" focus, however, theories of international politics, 
according to Waltz, have little to offer to students of foreign policy concerned with the 
decisions of the individual "units" (i.e. states).  
 
Other neorealists disagree. Colin Elman (1996), in particular, has made a strong case 
for "neorealist theories of foreign policy." We believe that Elman is on target and that 
Waltz – his merits in formulating a systemic neorealist theory notwithstanding – 
overstates the difference between the two intellectual enterprises. Even though the 
"dependent variables" or explananda (i.e. the kinds of facts one attempts to account 
for) are different (remember the first paragraph of this chapter), this does not mean 
that the ideas (including concepts, assumptions, and causal arguments) that inform a 
particular perspective on international politics are necessarily of no help in explaining 
the foreign policy choices and practices of states. Rather than making an abstract 
argument to this effect, we hope to show, in the following, that leading theories of 
international politics – once appropriately (re-)interpreted, extended, and transformed 
– indeed offer potentially valuable insights into the foreign policy of states as well. 
These theories are neorealism, (utilitarian) liberalism, and constructivism, 
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respectively.3
 
 
2.  Overview of IR Theories 
 
Before we describe in detail the approaches to foreign policy that can be derived from 
these three theories of international politics, let us overview the theories themselves so 
readers can have an idea of what distinguishes them one from the other. 
 
2.1.  Neorealism: States as Unitary Actors Sensitive to Cost 
Realism is a perspective on world politics with a long history reaching back as far as 
to antiquity and the Middle Ages (Forde 1992; Doyle 1997). Realists depict the world 
and especially the world of international relations as a dangerous place, where conflict 
and the threat of violence are ever-present and all to often escalate into disastrous wars 
which put at risk virtually everything that people value. Since states control the means 
of violence (i.e. the military apparatus), they are the crucial actors in international 
politics. While many classical realists have attributed the perceived inability of states 
to coexist in peace and harmony to flaws in human nature (Morgenthau 1946), the 
more recent school of neorealism – also referred to as "structural realism" – locates 
the sources of these and other observable attributes of international politics in the 
"international system," i.e. in the way that states are related to one another (Waltz 
1979).  
The most conspicuous and most consequential feature of the international system is 
anarchy, which means that there is no "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
force" (Max Weber) at the international level comparable to the domestic order of 
states. Anarchy, according to neorealists, creates a general sense of insecurity in 
actors, which often results in what they call a "security dilemma." Uncertainty makes 
(even) states with defensive intentions behave in ways which are perceived by other 
states as threatening. The latter feel forced to take "counter-measures" (e.g. increased 
spending on armaments in response to a similar policy by the other state or states), 
which, however, only serve to confirm the worries of the state(s) to whose actions 
they respond and to provoke further action by those states, etc.. 
Since there is no "world state" to protect the fundamental interests of the individual 
                                                     
3 One caveat is in order: Neorealist, liberal, and constructivist theories of international politics are not 
all of one piece, but come in several versions. Moreover, the process of transforming an interaction-
centered political theory into an action-oriented one is not straightforward, thus admitting of more 
than one possible outcome. As a consequence, none of the theories of foreign policy based on theories 
of international politics that will be presented 
 below can claim to be the one and only authentic statement on foreign policy of the respective school 
of thought: one might think of somewhat different neorealist, liberal, and constructivist theories of 
foreign policy. For more extensive treatments of theories of foreign policy implicit in neorealist, 
liberal, and constructivist approaches to the study of internatioal relations see Baumann et al. (2001), 
Freund and Rittberger (2001), and Boekle et al. (2001), respectively. 
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political communities, states are bound to secure their survival and welfare ultimately 
through self-help. Self-help is not incompatible with cooperation, but states are 
reluctant to enter into relationships that might undermine their self-help capacity or 
power. According to neorealism, states take an essential interest in power (defined 
primarily in terms of military and economic capabilities) not for its own sake but as a 
necessary means for achieving whatever security is available to them under the 
circumstances. States may value their neighbors' current peaceful intentions or 
international norms and institutions that delegitimize aggression and foster 
international cooperation, but they are always aware that, ultimately, they cannot 
depend on the longevity and efficacy of such favorable conditions.  
Power is not only an important property and goal of individual states. The prevailing 
distribution of power (in particular the number of great powers) is regarded by 
neorealists as another key attribute of the international system (alongside anarchy) that 
is responsible for the patterns of international behavior that we observe (e.g. the 
frequency of major wars in one period). In neorealist parlance, anarchy and the 
distribution of power are "constraints" (limits on the choices of states) to which actors 
respond in a consistent and rational way. According to Waltz, the responses of states 
to shifting circumstances will tend to be such that hegemony (i.e. the predominance of 
a single state) is avoided and a rough balance of power retained, or re-established, in 
the international system. 
 
2.2.  Utilitarian Liberalism: Individuals and Groups as Rational, Goal-Oriented  
         Actors 
Like the neorealist outlook on international politics, liberalism in international 
relations theory is firmly rooted in the history of political ideas, counting classical 
thinkers such as 18th and early 19th century political and moral philosophers Smith, 
Kant, and Bentham among its most important ancestors (Doyle 1997). The liberal 
perspective on international politics is sometimes broadly conceived so as to include a 
strong normative component emphasizing the political and social rights of individuals 
or to embody the utopian assumption that the interests of individuals and, by 
extension, those of states are harmonious at bottom. In this chapter we are dealing 
with liberalism as a positive (i.e. non-normative4) theory of international relations, 
which – although clearly less pessimistic than realism – holds that, depending on the 
circumstances, the goals of actors may as well clash as accord with one another. Like 
neorealism, the brand of liberalism we are looking at in this chapter works from the 
assumption that actors are self-interested and rationally pursue largely materialistic 
goals. Actors are not assumed to be altruists or to be motivated first and foremost by a 
                                                     
4 The distinguishing characteristic of a normative theory of international politics is not that it has 
recourse to social norms, but that it justifies (or criticizes) such norms or argues in favor of new norms 
that, according to the theory, actors should adopt. As we shall see below, constructivism takes social 
norms very seriously, but it is nevertheless a positive theory trying to account for the realities of 
international politics rather than making considered value judgments on international practices. 
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concern for the common good. To indicate this we henceforth use the qualifier 
"utilitarian."5
 
What clearly sets utilitarian liberalism apart from neorealism, however, is the identity 
of the actors it attributes central importance to when it comes to analyzing 
international relations. According to utilitarian liberalism, the "fundamental actors" of 
international politics are not unitary states, but individuals and groups within or 
without the political-administrative system such as voters, interest groups, political 
parties, bureaucrats, or politicians. Indeed, states are not actors at all but institutions 
which represent the interests of those societal actors although in a more or less skewed 
way. As a result, some of these interests are more likely to shape the foreign policy of 
the "state" (as conducted by the central decisionmakers) than others. Utilitarian 
liberals argue that what primarily drives international politics is not state power, but 
state preferences, adding that these preferences do not reflect the position of the state 
within an international hierarchy of power (as neorealists would have it), but the 
desires and differential influence of societal actors within the state. Similarly, the most 
important structures underlying international politics are not anarchy and the 
distribution of power among states, but domestic ("subsystemic") political institutions 
and practices affecting the process of preference formation as well as the resulting 
("systemic") configuration of state preferences with regard to the issue at hand. 
 
Particular strands within utilitarian liberalism build on these general premises to 
advance more specific hypotheses about the relationship between certain domestic and 
transnational structures and observable patterns of international behavior (Moravcsik 
1997, 2002). Thus, "republican liberals" examine the contribution to international 
peace made by democratic governance, while "commercial liberals" emphasize the 
disincentives to aggression and war that come with increased economic 
interdependence among nations.6 Others focus more narrowly on the process of 
preference formation with regard to specific issues and consequently on the structure 
of the particular "policy networks" in which the "state's" interests on the issue are 
                                                     
5In moral and political philosophy, "utilitarianism" denotes an ethical theory which argues that acting 
morally consists in making choices which have the best possible consequences for all affected 
(including oneself). In political science (including IR), "utilitarian" is often used in a somewhat 
different sense referring to an actor's disposition to maximize his or her own utility (well-being). Our 
term "utilitarian liberalism" harks back to the second usage. 
6 Some authors add a third strand, referred to as "regulatory liberalism," which focuses on the ability 
of international institutions to ameliorate the cooperation-inhibiting effects of anarchy (Keohane 
1990). In an important article, however, Andrew Moravcsik (1997) has pointed out that arguments 
about the causes and consequences of institution-building at the international level, although 
traditionally associated with liberalism, are in many respects closer to realism than to the core of the 
utilitarian liberal research program with its emphasis on the domestic sources of international political 
behavior. Consistent with an emerging scholarly consensus he therefore advocates treating 
"institutionalism" as a separate school of thought distinct from both realism and liberalism. Our 
interpretation of the utilitarian liberal perspective on foreign policy follows Moravcsik in this regard. 
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worked out by those societal (private and public) actors who are both capable and 
motivated to exert an influence. It is this latter, agency-based variant of utilitarian 
liberalism that we will pay most attention to in this chapter. 
 
 
2.3.  Constructivism: States as Role Players 
Constructivism is a school of thought in IR that has joined the "menu" of theoretical 
approaches to international politics only recently, although work done by the so-called 
"English School" (Bull 1977) and others has been identified as constructivist in 
retrospect (Adler 2002). Drawing on a variety of sources ranging from sociology to 
the philosophy of language, constructivists challenge the predominant rationalist 
mode of analysis, arguing that rationalists – including both realists and utilitarian 
liberals – ignore or downplay the role of ideas in international relations. "Idea" here is 
a broad category encompassing all kinds of beliefs, perceptions, and meanings that 
actors share and simultaneously presuppose and reproduce in their interactions or 
"practices." The social impact of material reality (including biologically-determined 
physiological needs) is not denied, but constructivists insist that whatever role 
material conditions play in shaping our individual and collective goals, behavioral 
options, and choices is mediated and, as a consequence, deeply affected by our 
"socially constructed" interpretations of this reality (Wendt 1999). 
 
For example, anarchy or a given distribution of military capabilities as such do not 
force a particular pattern of behaviors and attitudes upon the actors. Indeed, "anarchy 
is what states make of it" (Wendt 1992). This is because more important than the 
alleged causal effects of anarchy is its meaning to the actors, which is not fixed but 
varies with prevailing identities (i.e. images of the self and the other) embedded in a 
particular culture. According to Wendt (1999), the spectrum of ideal-typical "cultures 
of anarchy" ranges from a "Hobbesian" culture in which states regard and treat each 
other as enemies to a "Kantian" culture in which states define their security in 
collective rather than private terms, i.e. they perceive no incentive to pursue gains in 
security at the expense of others and regard each other's security as a common 
concern. Constructivists are aware that established identities and associated practices 
cannot be changed voluntaristically, but confront actors as "social facts" (Emile 
Durkheim). Still, they are malleable through reflection and discourse, and materialists 
and rationalists are wrong to elevate them to quasi-natural givens ("reification"). 
Constructivists are therefore particularly interested in the (learning) processes that 
underlie change in the identities and hence the preferences of actors.7
                                                     
7 Rationalist theories "exogenize" the preferences (desires, goals) of actors, i.e. such theories make 
reference to actors' preferences in their explanations of behavior but refrain from accounting for these 
preferences themselves. To be sure, liberals seek to explain state preferences, but, as we shall see in 
more detail below, the preferences of what they call the "fundamental actors" (private individuals and 
groups) are posited. 
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One type of idea the behavioral impact of which is particularly obvious and which is 
therefore intensely studied by constructivists are social norms. Rationalist theories of 
international politics have not been altogether ignorant of norms, but, according to 
constructivism, are unable to grasp their full social meaning, depicting them as 
constraints which rational actors take into account while choosing their utility-
maximizing course of action or as instruments that actors use to further their 
independently defined interests. From the constructivist point of view, this is a highly 
truncated interpretation of the role of norms in society, including international society. 
Norms do have instrumental value regulating behavior so as to help actors escape 
"social traps," but, at least as important, they have "constitutive effects" as well by 
setting the rules of the game of international politics which define who is an actor in 
the first place and what are its basic rights and responsibilities. "Sovereignty" is the 
prime example here. Moreover, what the rationalist view of norms fails to take 
account of is the fact that norms are not just "external data" to which actors may or 
may not respond, but, through processes of socialization, norms and the social roles 
they constitute are internalized by actors shaping their very self-understandings and 
their understandings of what is the appropriate behavior that is expected from them in 
a given social situation. Taking norms seriously thus implies that actors are more 
fruitfully described as "role players" than as "utility maximizers." 
 
 
3.  Basic Similarities and Differences Among Approaches 
 
As has become clear in the preceding pages, neorealist, (utilitarian-)liberal, and 
constructivist approaches to international relations differ in many respects. At the 
same time, there are important features which we find in more than one theory. Since 
these differences and similarities carry over to the foreign policy "branches" of these 
theories, it is appropriate to take a closer look at them. 
 
3.1.  What Motivates the Actor 
The most important difference among the three approaches is an ontological one and 
pertains to their underlying "actor models." An actor model is a highly stylized 
description of the way that social actors come to act, the kinds of considerations that 
enter into their decisions, their basic motives, etc.. Note that such a model is a 
conceptual construct guiding and informing the process of theory building rather than 
a purportedly faithful picture of reality whose accuracy we might discover by simply 
looking at the "facts." Hence, its empirical justification can only be an indirect one, 
namely one based on the predictive and explanatory success of the theories it helps to 
construct. While neorealism and utilitarian liberalism endorse the model of homo 
oeconomicus, signaling their membership in the class of rationalist theories of politics, 
constructivists build their accounts of international politics and foreign policy on the 
notion of homo sociologicus. Let me briefly explain what precisely this involves in 
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each case. 
 
Theories that rely on the model of homo oeconomicus conceive of actors as self-
interested (or, more generally, goal-oriented) individuals or organizations whose 
behavior results from rational calculations concerning costs and benefits. Actors 
consciously pursue goals which they strive to attain at minimum costs. From among 
the choices facing them, these actors pick the one that is optimal given their 
preferences and the constraints they face. Both neorealism and utilitarian liberalism do 
not normally attempt to explain actors' goals. In other words, the desires of actors are 
assumed rather than determined by the theory; that is, preferences are not empirically 
investigated but posited by assumption. According to this rationalist actor model, 
alternative courses of action are evaluated and then chosen in light of their expected 
consequences for actors' goals (March and Olsen 1989:23-24). When homo 
oeconomicus confronts several options, he proceeds by asking himself the following 
questions (although in most cases unconsciously and implictly rather than consciously 
and explicitly): 
 
 (1) What are my options? 
 (2) What are my goals? 
 (3) What are the likely consequences of each of my options? 
(4) Which option is best for me in light of my goals, i.e. which maximizes 
my net benefit (taking into account the probabilities of the various 
possible outcomes associated with any given choice)? 
 
For example, a government that, by signing a multilateral treaty, has promised to 
contribute to the combat against global warming might come to realize that living up 
to this commitment will be extraordinarily costly. It will look at its options, e.g. break 
the treaty openly (with or without a plea for understanding to its partners), attempt to 
violate the treaty surreptitiously, try to circumvent it somehow, try to renegotiate, or 
simply comply despite the inconvenience. It will try to anticipate the consequences of 
each possible course of action open to it: the responses of partners and third parties, 
potential damage to its reputation as a cooperation partner, longer term effects on the 
environment and on the economy, etc.. Finally, it will make its choice, picking the 
option with the most favorable balance of benefits, costs, and risks – for example, it 
may decide to withdraw from the treaty, because it has come to the conclusion that the 
others will reduce their emissions of carbondioxide anyway giving it the chance to 
free-ride on their efforts. 
 
Constructivist authors reject this depiction of social actors as too calculating and self-
interested. They point out that actors are always embedded in a social context that 
heavily impacts on their behavior. It is, therefore, appropriate to refer to their actor 
model as homo sociologicus. In contrast to homo oeconomicus, homo sociologicus is 
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not "programmed" by a given set of goals that preordain certain actions. Rather the 
actor plays a social role (or rather several roles) which he has acquired through a 
process of socialization and whose dictates he attempts to live up to in the situation at 
hand. As a consequence, what drives an actor's behavior are not the likely 
consequences of different courses of action for the attainment of given goals; rather, a 
certain course of behavior is adopted because it is in agreement with the 
intersubjectively shared, value-based expectations of what is appropriate behavior 
emanating from the actor's social environment (March and Olsen 1989:23-26). Once 
again, the decision-making process of homo sociologicus can be modeled by a set of 
questions that the actor puts to himself. (Again he need not ask these questions 
explicitly or in the order that they are presented here.) 
  
(1) What kind of situation am I in? 
 (2) Which of my several social roles is called upon in this situation? 
(3) To what extent does each of the behavioral options I face conform to 
this role? 
(4)      Which is the most appropriate course of behavior (given my situation,    
          my roles, and my options)? 
 
Returning to our example, constructivists would expect the government becoming 
aware of the high costs of cutting down CO2-emissions to analyze, and eventually 
resolve, its decision problem not in terms of the effects of different options on the 
long-term welfare (security, power, etc.) of the country, but in terms of its obligations 
and responsibilities as they are linked to its roles in both international and domestic 
society. Since actors in any society occupy multiple roles, acting-as-role-playing is 
frequently neither straightforward nor free from serious internal and external conflict. 
In our example, the government might face the difficulty of reconciling its domestic 
role as "protector of the national interest" with its international role of "a law-abiding 
member of the international community of states," or, perhaps more specifically, "the 
leader of the world." Finally, there is no a priori reason to assume that it will reach a 
different decision than the government in our previous example – only that the reasons 
and the reasoning will be different. 
 
These differences between the actor models of homo oeconomicus and of homo 
sociologicus have far-reaching implications. Depending on their respective 
conceptions of what the actor is like, theories of foreign policy will address different 
questions in accounting for the foreign policy behavior of states. A theory which 
assumes that actors are self-interested goal seekers has to address the question of 
which goals are sought by the actors under study. As we shall see shortly, the answers 
given by neorealism and utilitarian liberalism are, respectively, security and "power 
and plenty."  In contrast, a theory such as constructivism which assumes that actors 
are role-oriented and behave in accordance with the intersubjectively shared, value-
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based expectations of appropriate behavior emanating from their pertinent social 
environment has to inquire into these roles and expectations that may be expressed in 
imperatives such as "Germany must never again become a source of militarized 
conflict in Europe and, therefore, shall support European integration" or "The United 
States is 'second to none' and, thus, should not enter into binding commitments that 
severely constrain its sovereignty." 
 
3.2.  Influences Shaping Foreign Policy 
Theories of foreign policy derived from International Relations not only disagree on 
how to conceive of actors and their basic motivations but they study the foreign policy 
of states from different angles (Hollis and Smith 1990). On the one hand, there are 
"top-down approaches" which, metaphorically speaking, view the behavior of states 
"from above," that is, from the perspective of the international system. Key to the 
behavior of states, according to these theories, are the incentives, constraints, or 
standards of behavior that arise in the international arena and, thus, are systemic in 
origin. Neorealism adopts this systemic point of view. In particular, actors are 
interested in their relative power position in the international domain and the polarity 
of that system. For example, India cares for its own economic and social development, 
but, for reasons of security, it is bound also to take an interest in how China's or even 
Pakistan's capabilities grow or shrink relative to its own. 
 
On the other hand, there are "bottom-up approaches," that is, theories which, again 
metaphorically speaking, seek to explain the foreign policy of states "from below" 
with a focus on what is happening in a country. Such theories assume that the foreign 
policy of states is primarily determined by the confluence of domestic factors. In this 
sense, utilitarian liberalism is pitched at the subsystemic level. For example, an 
armament race involving two countries may at first sight appear to reflect their 
governments' mutual distrust and uncertainty – the mechanism that neorealists call the 
"security dilemma." Closer inspection may reveal, however, that in one or both 
countries there are winning coalitions (sometimes referred to as "military-industrial 
complex") whose members benefit from increased defense spending and who, due to 
the resources they control (money, media, etc.), are in a position to exert strong 
influence on the government's defense policy steering it towards higher military 
expenditures largely irrespective of what other states do. 
 
Constructivists, in contrast, consider that both international and domestic 
circumstances, i.e. the norms and role-expectations prevailing at these levels, affect 
what states do in the foreign policy arena. Including both foci can create a difficulty 
for them when the international and the domestic value-based expectations of what is 
appropriate behavior are at odds with one another. To illustrate: Germany‘s NATO 
allies unequivocally expected Germany after unification and the end of the Cold War, 
for reasons of alliance solidarity, to participate in NATO "out-of-area" missions such 
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as the Gulf War in 1991. At the same time, the German federal government was 
confronted with very strong and principled domestic opposition against such action. 
Which set of factors takes precedence in determining what German foreign policy will 
result? Are international or domestic expectations more determinative of what is likely 
to happen? 
  
 
Table 1 summarizes key features of the three theories under consideration, as they will 
be presented and discussed in greater detail below. 
 
Table 1:  Key Features of IR-Derived Theories of Foreign Policy 
IR-source of 
Theory 
Actor’s 
Motivation 
Independent 
Variable 
Components 
of 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Neorealism 
 
goal-oriented relative 
position of 
power in the 
international 
system 
power 
resources and 
polarity of the 
international 
system 
power politics:  
autonomy 
and/or 
influence-
seeking policy 
Utilitarian 
Liberalism 
goal-oriented dominant 
societal 
interests 
structure of 
pertinent 
policy network 
gains-seeking 
policy 
Constructivism role-oriented international/ 
domestic 
social norms 
commonality/ 
specificity of 
norm 
norm-
consistent 
policy 
 
 
 
4.  Rationalist Theories of Foreign Policy 
 
4.1. Dependent Variables and "Actors' Goals" 
Neorealism and utilitarian liberalism assume that actors are goal-seeking utility-
maximizers. Both approaches, therefore, must account for the nature of the goals that 
actors pursue. Both neorealists and utilitarian liberals assume that their rational and 
self-interested actors, first and foremost, are concerned with securing their own 
survival. In each theory this fundamental goal is ascribed to a particular type of actor, 
however. As an international system driven approach, neorealism focuses on states (or 
a union of states) as the basic unit of analysis; that is, Brazil, China, the United States, 
and the European Union (as opposed to the Brazilian, Chinese, and U.S. governments 
or the European Commission) are examples of the actors in world affairs. As unitary 
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actors, according to neorealism, states seek to survive or, more precisely, direct their 
foreign policy behavior to insure their survival. Surviving, in this case, is about 
securing a state's territorial integrity and rightful claim to self-determination – in other 
words, insuring that the state continues to exist as an independent unit in the 
international system. In contrast, utilitarian liberalism, which focuses on the domestic 
factors that can shape foreign policy, views societal actors (organized private actors 
and actors in the political-administrative system) as the units to analyze and attributes 
to them a basic interest in survival. Survival, in this case, involves, inter alia, the 
protection of the goals of important interest groups and of political and bureaucratic 
actors in the country. In effect, the consequences for the foreign policy behavior and 
the motivation for survival as described by these two theories are quite different.  Let 
us explore these differences in more detail. 
  
4.1.1.  Neorealism 
Neorealists assume that states want to secure their survival in a competitive and 
potentially hostile international system. States as rational self-interested actors are 
constrained to make sure (to the extent possible) that no threat to their security 
emerges from such an international environment. Security is not their only goal, but it 
is the most fundamental one, given that the pursuit of other goals is dependent on their 
being able to achieve a sufficient degree of security. From a neorealist point of view, 
there can never be complete security for states in what is essentially an anarchical self-
help international system; states must always strive to preserve or increase their 
security. For example, at one time in history a state may be "encircled by friends," 
which share its commitment to democracy and the rule of law and to which it has 
close and mutually beneficial economic and institutional ties. But this is not a 
guarantee against the possibility that one day economic conditions may worsen 
dramatically and durably, bringing to power governments with a nationalist and 
perhaps revisionist foreign policy agenda and unwilling to continue to bear what they 
refer to as "grossly disproportionate" burdens of cooperation, etc.. In other words, 
"friends" may turn into "rivals" and, if the worst comes to the worst, even into 
"enemies" – a possibility that, according to neorealism, states must and do take into 
account even in the most "harmonious" of times. 
 
To further their security, states basically have two options. (1) They can try to protect 
and possibly increase their own autonomy, that is, their de facto, rather than formal, 
independence from other actors by curtailing the attempts of others to control them. 
States value their autonomy, because the lack of an effective arbitrator in an 
anarchical international system means that a state must ultimately rely on itself and its 
own resources in its conflicts with other states. In order to pursue self-help strategies 
successfully, however, states need to be in full control of their resources, i.e. they need 
to safeguard their autonomy. For example, joining a military alliance may help a state 
to reduce its defense expenditures. On the other hand, through its formal promise to 
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come to the aid of its allies if attacked, it pre-commits its resources to a cause, which, 
when it comes to the crunch, may turn out not it be its own. (2) States can attempt to 
gain influence over other states, either directly (and bilaterally) or indirectly through 
alliances or international and supranational organizations in which they play a 
dominant role (e.g., hegemon or veto player) or which, at least, provide them with 
voice opportunities (Grieco 1995). In other words: greater security can be achieved 
not only by maximizing control over one's own resources but by getting a say in how 
others use theirs. Sometimes such a strategy is pursued by intentionally creating 
relationships of asymmetrical interdependence, for example, when an economically 
strong state develops and maintains a set of bilateral relationships with lesser states 
from which the latter benefit disproportionately. This gives the state with the large and 
more developed economy political leverage vis-à-vis its partners by virtue of the 
credible threat to freeze or even cut down economic ties with them should their 
foreign policies continue to be "insensitive" to its "legitimate" interests. Another 
variant of this strategy works through international institutions whose formal or 
informal rules and procedures give the state in question a disproportionate influence 
on the institution's agenda and policy – where "disproportionate influence" can either 
mean 'more influence than other members of the institution' or 'more influence on 
political outcomes than the state would have were there no such institution in the first 
place.'  
 
From the point of view of neorealism, therefore, maximizing autonomy and influence 
are the most immediate foreign policy goals. Consequently, states in their foreign 
policy engage in both autonomy-seeking and influence-seeking behavior, which, in 
turn, are variants of power politics. There are situations, however, in which the goals 
of maximizing autonomy and influence are in conflict with one another such that a 
substantial increase in influence upon other states can only be achieved at the price of 
a significant loss of autonomy (or vice versa). For example, in multilateral settings 
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), enhancing one's influence over others 
may require sacrifices in one's autonomy. For one thing, a state attempting to persuade 
other members to change their trade policies to its favor is likely to be unsuccessful 
unless it offers concessions of its own. For another, new rules will be binding not only 
on others but on itself, too. Our example of the state considering joining a military 
alliance is also a case in point. The very rules (of solidarity) that will reduce its 
capacity to autonomously decide how it will use its military capabilities in a crisis 
provide this state with some measure of influence on the choices of others – an 
influence that may well turn out vital in a situation in which it becomes the target of 
an aggression or even at an earlier stage, i.e. when another state weighs the benefits 
and risks of attacking it. 
 
How do neorealists expect states to decide when confronting this type of dilemma? 
Inspecting the literature reveals that, at this point in time, neorealists disagree among 
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themselves in a systematic fashion. Indeed, there are currently two variants of 
neorealist foreign policy theory coming down on different sides on this issue. 
 
The standard version of neorealism (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) solves the 
dilemma by assuming that states always give priority to securing their independence 
or autonomy because they make foreign policy choices on the basis of worst-case 
scenarios. According to standard neorealism, the very fact that there are more 
powerful states or more powerful (actual or potential) alliances "out there" induces in 
states a constant fear for their security. Even when a state's security is not currently 
threatened and a military conflict does not seem to be imminent, a state must reckon 
with the possibility (however remote it may be) that "the worst comes to the worst." 
The best way for a state to prepare for this possibility is to safeguard or increase its 
autonomy. Influence as, for example, that derived from voting rights in international 
organizations is of little use when a conflict escalates into a confrontation involving 
the threat or use of military force; more powerful states may simply decide to ignore 
these rights or, more likely, to render them valueless by circumventing the 
organization.  Consider how the U.S. and its allies failed to get authorization from the 
United Nations Security Council when NATO decided to intervene militarily in the 
former Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 thus preventing Russia and China 
from having any decisive say in what happened. Whenever there is a trade-off 
between autonomy and influence, states will decide in favor of maintaining their 
independence. They will not accept losses in autonomy in exchange for higher levels 
of influence. 
 
In contrast, modified neorealism assumes that states do not invariably base their 
decisions on worst-case scenarios (Brooks 1997; see also Snyder 1996; Schweller and 
Priess 1997). Rather, states take into account the probability (as opposed to the mere 
possibility) of threats to their security. They are aware that this probability, and hence 
their insecurity, varies due to a variuety of factors such as technology, economy, and 
geography. When the probability of a threat to a state’s security is low, it may well be 
rational for that state to trade autonomy for influence – to be willing to give up part of 
its capacity for independent action if this is a prerequisite for gaining a significantly 
greater degree of influence upon the behavior of other states or upon the decisions, 
programs, or operational activities of alliances or international and supranational 
organizations. For example, proponents of standard neorealism would be hard pressed 
to explain why many states, though having the technical capacities to produce nuclear 
weapons, have renounced the option to acquire such weaponry or why a state such as 
Ukraine has given up voluntarily a nuclear arsenal that it already possessed. Here 
modified neorealists could point out that, in the absence of high security pressures, 
such choices are consistent with power politics as they help to preserve and strengthen 
institutions (here: the nuclear non-proliferation regime) through which the states in 
question are able to influence the security policies of others to their favor (Brooks 
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1997:465-466). 
To sum up, both versions of neorealism agree that states engage in power politics as a 
means of securing their survival. In so doing, they practice both autonomy-seeking 
and influence-seeking policies. The only case in which the two versions of neorealism 
arrive at different predictions is when there are: (1) no significant present threats to the 
security of that state and (2) the gains in influence that could be reaped as a result of 
yielding a small or moderate degree of autonomy are sizeable. In such a case, 
standard neorealism still predicts that the state will not compromise its autonomy 
even if that means forgoing substantial gains in influence, whereas modified 
neorealism expects that the state will trade part of its autonomy for an improved 
opportunity to exert influence on other states' behavior.8
 
4.1.2.  Utilitarian Liberalism 
Neorealism's basic assumption is that the pressures on states emanating from the 
structure of their international environment (viz., anarchy, distribution of power) are 
strong enough to elicit similar behavior from states with similar position in the 
international system. Utilitarian liberalism, while not denying that states are 
constrained by the international system, argues that the sources of foreign policy lie 
primarily in the domestic environment of states. More specifically, utilitarian 
liberalism argues that a state's foreign policy goals are determined by the interests of 
dominant societal actors; in other words, a state will pursue that policy which best 
serves the interests of these actors (Moravcsik 2002, 1997).  
 
Utilitarian liberalism agrees with neorealism that actors' desire to survive is a key 
category in theoretical foreign policy analysis. However, this theory attributes such a 
desire to a different type of actor than does neorealism, substituting, in effect, societal 
actors for states. As noted before, societal actors are a heterogeneous class of 
decision-making and decision-influencing "units," encompassing both actors 
belonging to the "private sector" and actors in the "political-administrative system." 
Private actors are companies such as DaimlerChrysler or AOL Time Warner, 
economic pressure groups such as trade unions or employers' associations, and 
political advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace or, occasionally, 
religious communities; similarly, actors in the "political-administrative system" break 
down into politicians (who often come to power through elections) and administrators 
and bureaucracies entrusted with certain tasks, e.g., in the making and executing of 
laws and regulations. 
                                                     
8 The jury is still out on the question of which of the two variants of neorealism does a better job in 
explaining the foreign policy behavior of states, i.e. whether the loss of parsimony that modified 
neorealism accepts by adding further variables (accounting for the probability of violent conflict) is 
offset by gains in predictive power. Case study based research strongly suggests, however, that adding 
some complexity may have indeed been worthwhile and that modified neorealism may enjoy 
significant advantages over standard neorealism with respect to explanatory leverage (Brooks 
1997:463-469; Rittberger and Wagner 2001). 
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Shifting the focus from states to societal actors as the subjects of interest involves a 
modification in the meaning of "survival" and "security."  The quest for survival on 
the part of societal actors is not confined to securing one's physical existence but, 
indeed, centers on preserving or improving one's social status. "Survival" in this 
context, therefore, really means "survival as X (e.g., as a highly competitive firm on 
the world market, as the head of government, etc.)." In general, societal actors can 
secure their survival in two (mutually non-exclusive) ways: (1) they can act to 
safeguard or increase their income and assets, or (2) they can take steps to protect or 
expand their competencies (making them ever more indispensable). Thus, according 
to utilitarian liberalism, societal actors strive for "plenty" and "power." Which of the 
two goals an actor gives priority to is contingent on that actor’s function in society.  
Bureaucratic and political actors are primarily concerned with their competencies and 
only secondarily with income, in particular control over budgetary resources; in 
contrast, private actors such as firms and interest as well as advocacy groups seek to 
maximize their income and, more specifically, attempt to increase their collective 
income by means of the growth in sales, donations or members' contributions that 
comes with achieving the (material or immaterial) goals of the organization. For 
example, through its various, sometimes high-profile activities Greenpeace seeks to 
attract and keep up the financial support by both members and sympathetic outsiders 
that it needs in order to be able to continue these very activities.9  
 
Thus, at a more general level, gains-seeking is the primary motivation common to all 
societal actors. Gains are either material (income, assets) or immaterial 
(competencies). Since utilitarian liberalism claims that the goals which are pursued by 
the most assertive societal actors translate into the goals of the state in its dealings 
with other states and societies, the nature of foreign policy, according to this theory, is 
appropriately conceived of as policy that is directed toward seeking gains rather than 
the power politics of neorealism. 
 
 
4.2.   Independent Variables 
In the preceding section, the dependent variables studied by our two rationalist 
theories of foreign policy were derived from the basic assumptions these theories 
make about the goals of actors. Now, we turn to how these theories explain the 
variation in the foreign policy behavior of states. What are their independent 
                                                     
9 Aren't we putting the cart before the horse when we attribute to such organizations a basic interest in 
increasing their financial means rather than, e.g., saving the planet? And aren't we blurring the 
distinction between business firms and non-profit organizations this way? The perspective adopted 
here may indeed appear, at first sight, a cynical one. However, the point is not to denounce the 
motives of such groups as Amnesty International or Friends of the Earth but to acknowledge that 
sufficiently abundant and possibly growing funds are a necessary immediate goal even of such public 
interest groups or advocacy coalitions if they wish to be able to work successfully for their pro-social 
goals – a fact that is exploited here to keep the complexity of the theory at bay. 
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variables? What factors do the theories propose shape states’ foreign policy activities? 
 
4.2.1.  Neorealism 
Even though neorealists postulate that all states pursue the same goals of maximizing 
their autonomy and influence, these theorists believe that states behave differently 
because they differ in the extent to which they are able to translate these goals into 
action. "Weak" states are hardly in a position to evade the influence exerted upon 
them by the international environment or to exert much influence on that environment 
themselves. In contrast, "strong" states have the capability to successfully defend or 
even increase their autonomy or their influence upon others. Consequently, such states 
are more likely to display effective autonomy- or influence-seeking behavior. To put it 
differently: the more powerful a state, the more likely it is to engage in power politics. 
Hence, the relative power position of a state is the factor neorealists posit as the most 
critical in accounting for a state’s foreign policy; it is the independent variable in 
neorealism. A state's relative power position in an international system is a function of 
both its share in the overall sum of power resources (capabilities) in that system and 
the polarity (uni-, bi-, or multipolarity) of the system. 
 
Power is defined here as control over resources and is based, above all, on the 
availability of the  economic and military capabilities that allow a state to assert its 
interests in dealing with other states. Capabilities are seen as highly fungible, meaning 
that power is a general potential which can be used in disparate areas of foreign 
policy. Although the concept of power is a central analytical category to neorealists, 
they have yet to indicate satisfactorily what the significant capabilities for the pursuit 
of power politics are and how such capabilities are to be measured. While we cannot 
fall back on a generally accepted canon of capabilities, it is undisputed among 
neorealists that a state‘s economic and military strength are core components of its 
power. To measure economic strength, neorealists evaluate a country‘s GDP, export 
volume, and currency‘s share in world reserves, while military spending, the size of 
the armed forces, and the possession of nuclear weapons are taken as indicators of 
military strength. Other capabilities that are at times taken into account are population 
size and territory. As "power" is a relative concept, any measurement of a state‘s 
power must consider the relative size of its capabilities in comparison with those of 
other relevant states. To illustrate the notion of "relative power position," let us take a 
look at two large states in Europe and compare the capabilities of France with those of 
the United Kingdom. Relative to each other these two countries are more or less on 
par with one another: both are nuclear powers, their population size is roughly equal, 
and the difference in their GDP is small. However, relative to the U.S., their overall 
power position is considerably weaker. According to neorealism, these relationships 
translate into France and the UK enjoying similar latitudes in their foreign policies but 
having considerably less room for maneuver internationally than the United States. 
 
 18
Neorealists also regard the polarity of the current international system as a decisive 
determinant of the durability and war-proneness of the system. Polarity is defined by 
the number of great powers or, if there are any, "superpowers" in the system. Above 
all, neorealists distinguish between bipolar and non-bipolar (multipolar and unipolar) 
systems. The polarity of the international system influences a state‘s relative power 
position (and hence its ability to engage in power politics) because the number of 
major powers determines the freedom of maneuver of states in the system and how 
easy it is for states to employ their capabilities. In a bipolar system, even major 
powers are confronted with the need to align themselves with one of the two 
"superpowers" in order to maximize their chances of survival, thus facing restrictions 
on employing their capabilities. When a bipolar system is being transformed, the 
power positions of the former superpowers are posited to depend on whether there is a 
shift toward multipolarity or unipolarity. In the case of multipolarity, the power 
positions of former superpowers decline approaching that of other major powers 
whereas, in the case of unipolarity, the sole remaining superpower‘s relative position 
in the system becomes the standard to which others are compared while the position 
of its erstwhile competitor is reduced to that of a "normal" major power. The 
transformation of a bipolar system into a non-bipolar one will invariably improve 
major states‘ relative power positions, even if their shares in the capabilities available 
in the system have not increased. Taking the structural condition of the international 
system after the Cold War as an example, neorealists infer that there has been, at least 
termporarily, a movement toward unipolarity resulting in increased strategic leeway 
for the major powers in the system: these states can choose to balance – attempt to 
form a counter-alliance against the sole remaining superpower, the U.S.; to remain 
unaligned – not to tie themselves firmly to other states; or even to bandwagon – attach 
themselves to the U.S. –, because balancing would seem futile or even counter-
productive, and hence to pick an option which, according to neorealists, would be 
anathema to them under most other circumstances (Waltz 1979).10
 
 
4.2.2.  Utilitarian Liberalism 
The core idea of utilitarian liberalism is that the foreign policy preferences of states – 
and, as a consequence, their behavior vis-à-vis other states – do not originate in the 
state's international environment, but reflect instead the interests of the private actors 
who are in a position to impose their goals on the agents representing the state in the 
international arena or those of the most assertive political and bureaucratic actors in 
instances when these enjoy sufficient autonomy from organized private actors. The 
                                                     
10 Once bandwagoning has come to be seen by major powers as more rational than balancing, they 
may even engage in what might be called "competitive bandwagoning," i.e. try to create and nourish 
"special relationships" with the superpower in pursuit of extra benefits such as enhanced status and 
greater influence. Britain‘s foreign and security policy toward the U.S., on the one hand, and toward 
the European Union, on the other, may be a case in point. 
 19
critical factor, then, for utilitarian liberalism in explaining a state’s foreign policy – 
this theory’s independent variable – focuses on the country’s dominant societal 
interests. These interests are always specific to the issue area or problem facing the 
country. They emerge from policy networks composed of actors who have a stake in 
the issues at hand. Policy networks involve organized private and political-
administrative actors bound together in an interdependent and relatively stable 
relationship. Members of the network exchange information, consult with one another, 
offer or threaten to withdraw political support, allocate public tasks, and enter into 
bargaining processes with respect to the formulation and implementation of policy 
(Freund and Rittberger 2001:74-75). Since there will be different policy networks for 
different kinds of problems, utilitarian liberalism cannot be as parsimonious a theory 
as neorealism. Nevertheless, it aspires to provide an explanatory model that, in 
principle, is capable of predicting the foreign policy goals a state will pursue with 
regard to a given issue. This model seeks to capture the essence of the process of 
interest intermediation from society to the state. As any model in social science, it 
employs simplifications and assumptions. 
 
The explanatory model that utilitarian liberalism proposes is built from the following 
component parts: (1) an account of the basic interests of the societal actors most 
directly involved in dealing with particular issues of political relevance to the country, 
(2) an account of the composition and the structure of foreign policy networks that 
form around particular issues, and (3) an account of the factors which determine 
which actor is likely to dominate a given policy network and thus whose basic 
interests are likely to be reflected in the state's foreign policy with regard to that 
specific issue. Let us look at each of these components more closely. 
 
As to the first component, we have already seen that each domestic societal actor 
enmeshed in a policy network is motivated by a basic interest in survival and that the 
means of choice to secure one's survival – i.e. survival as an organization or as an 
occupant of a certain role or office – are "power" (policy-making competencies) and 
"plenty" (financial income and assets). While political and bureaucratic actors strive 
most of all to retain or extend their policy-making competencies, i.e. to remain in 
office and to claim additional tasks, responsibilities or resources, organized private 
actors such as companies or unions are primarily concerned with securing and 
increasing their income and wealth and that of their members. For example, presidents 
and prime ministers want to be re-elected; national administrators, fearful of gradually 
becoming side-lined, are reluctant to give up competencies, for instance, in favor of a 
supranational organ such as the EU‘s European Commission; companies seek to 
maintain and improve their competitiveness on global markets and expect their 
governments to support them in this endeavor; unions expect governments to pursue 
macroeconomic policies with a view to enhancing employment opportunities since 
they are concerned about a decline in membership and the concomitant losses of 
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contributions.  
 
These basic interests are still too coarse to sustain explanations of political behavior 
both within and without policy networks. Utilitarian liberal theory therefore proceeds 
to specify actor-specific "foreign policy preferences," which derive from the basic 
interests of the respective type of actor. These foreign policy preferences can be 
expressed most conveniently in the form of maxims or self-directed imperatives. For 
example, political actors such as members of government follow the maxim: "Support 
foreign policies that satisfy expectations of voters by improving the performance of 
the economy, by meeting partisan objectives, and by maintaining intra-governmental 
cohesion." This is because they know that voters evaluate the success of the 
government predominantly in economic terms and dislike intra-governmental conflict 
which they believe undercuts the effectiveness and efficiency of policy (Freund and 
Rittberger 2001:81-84). Administrative actors, economic pressure-groups, and 
political advocacy groups all share the maxim: "Fulfill the organizational purpose," 
although the precise content of this rule of course varies with the type of actor. For 
example, economic pressure groups fulfill their purpose by increasing their members' 
opportunities to make profit or securing higher wages for them. Policy advocacy 
groups (environmental activists, human rights organizations, etc.) have different 
mandates and so – often, but not always – seek different foreign policies in order to 
satisfy their members and supporters, e.g., they try to persuade their government to 
assume a leadership role in the fight against world poverty or climate change or to 
commit itself to put pressure on human rights violators. 
 
Both the priorities set by these societal actors and the nature and hierarchy of their 
more specific foreign policy preferences are grounded in their dependencies on 
particular types of resources (in the broadest sense). In order to secure their (social) 
survival, societal actors need certain resources, and these resources, in turn, are 
controlled by other societal actors in their environment. For example, heads of 
government in many democracies depend for their survival in office on votes 
delivered by various constituencies or voting blocs. According to utilitarian 
liberalism, this resource dependency has important consequences: it gives societal 
actors in policy networks strong incentives to advocate policies that are consistent 
with the expectations of those actors who control the resources that are of critical 
importance to them. 
 
We now turn to the second and third components of the utilitarian liberal explanatory 
model, i.e. utilitarian liberalism's general arguments about how policy networks are 
set up and who is most likely to get its way in such a network and hence to determine 
the basic direction of foreign policy with regard to the issue concerned. Two concepts 
are at the core of these arguments: (1) the level of mobilization of societal actors and 
(2) the degree of autonomy of political and bureaucratic actors from private actors. 
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The level of mobilization helps to determine with regard to the foreign policy issue at 
hand who will be part of the relevant policy network and also who among the political 
and bureaucratic actors involved and who among the private actors within the network 
will be most influential or "assertive" on the particular problem. Only actors with 
some degree of mobilization will be part of the network, and the kind and intensity of 
mobilization account for the degree of "assertiveness" an actor exhibits in the 
network. Finally, whether the most assertive political and bureaucratic actor's desires 
or instead the most assertive private network member's interests will eventually prove 
dominant in shaping the state's foreign policy on this issue turns upon the degree of 
autonomy that the actors in the public sector enjoy from the more highly mobilized 
private actor(s) within a specific policy network. Let us explain what each of these 
concepts refers to and how they work together to produce utilitarian liberalism's 
causal argument. 
 
Mobilization of a particular societal actor roughly corresponds to its potential power 
and the intensity of its preferences with regard to the issue at hand. Thus, in the case 
of actors from the private sector (companies, trade associations and unions, political 
advocacy groups), mobilization is a function of factors such as the number of 
individuals it represents or its capacity to generate policy-relevant technical or social 
information and expertise. Utilitarian liberals call this type of mobilization "structural 
mobilization," since it indicates the capacity an actor has for exerting influence. 
Mobilization also appears to be high when the actor's (or its constituency's) interests 
are strongly affected by the issue under consideration – what is considered "situative 
mobilization." For example, when under the WTO-based international trade regime 
negotiations get under way with a view to cutting down subsidies for the agricultural 
sector, farmers and their associations‘ basic interests will be strongly affected by these 
negotiations and hence they will display a high situative mobilization. Utilitarian 
liberalism predicts that an issue-specific policy network is formed by those public and 
private sector actors who have at least some minimum level of both structural and 
situative mobilization. To keep things manageable, proponents of this theory, then, 
focus on those actors who are the most assertive ones within the two sectors, 
proceeding to ask which of these is likely to impose its preferences on the policy 
network as a whole and, hence, on the state with respect to this foreign policy issue.  
 
It is postulated that the winner of this "end game" will be the most assertive public 
sector actor(s) if its (their) dependence on the cooperation of the most assertive private 
sector actor(s) is low; conversely, the latter will tend to call the shots if the most 
assertive public sector actor(s), in order to fulfill its (their) organizational purpose, is 
(are) highly dependent on accessing the private sector actors‘ resources. In other 
words, only if the most assertive political-administrative actors are capable of 
relatively autonomous choice their preferences will prevail. Note that this procedure 
does not necessarily result in a single dominant societal interest. For example, there 
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may be (symmetrical) interdependence rather than a one-sided dependence between 
the key public and private sector actors in the policy network. In such situations, 
utilitarian liberalism must remain agnostic with regard to the outcome, unless the 
foreign policy preferences of the dominant public and private actors happen to 
converge. 
 
To sum up, according to utilitarian liberalism, the foreign policies of states are shaped 
by the interests of the dominant societal actors. The structure of the pertinent foreign 
policy network reveals which actors are dominant in the respective issue area. 
Membership in, and dominance of, a foreign policy network is determined, first, by 
the extent to which public and private sector actors are structurally and situatively 
mobilized and, second, by the extent to which public sector actors are dependent on 
the resources the actors from the private sector can provide them with. Once the 
dominant actors are known, a state's foreign policy preferences in the situation can be 
derived from their basic interests in either "power" or "plenty." These domestically 
constituted foreign policy preferences account for the external behavior of the state in 
a particular situation.11
 
 
5.  Constructivist Theory of Foreign Policy 
 
5.1.  Dependent Variable and "Standards of Behavior" 
As suggested in the beginning of this chapter, constructivist foreign policy theory has 
recourse to an actor model that is markedly different from the one employed by 
rationalist theories (neorealism and utilitarian liberalism). Homo sociologicus does not 
act to secure a set of selfish goals; rather, he seeks to conform to the intersubjectively 
shared, value-based expectations of appropriate behavior emanating from his social 
environment. Hence, a theory of foreign policy which builds upon this actor model 
has to identify the standards of behavior that a state recognizes as binding. 
 
From a constructivist point of view, actors follow social norms they have internalized 
in the course of their socialization into relevant social systems. These systems may be 
domestic or international. Social norms are distinguished from other ideational 
variables such as beliefs, world views, identity, and culture by virtue of three 
characteristics. (1) Norms have prescriptive status, i.e. they orientate actors' behavior 
immediately and can be translated easily into imperatives for action ("Do this!" "Don't 
do that!"). Norms are value-based involving "issues of justice and rights of a moral or 
ethical character" (Goertz and Diehl 1992:638-639) and exert a "compliance pull" on 
actors (Franck 1990; Hurrell 1993). By contrast, ideas or beliefs may but need not 
                                                     
11 For reasons of space, the utilitarian liberal theory of foreign policy has been somewhat simplified in 
here. For a more complete and detailed description consult Freund and Rittberger (2001). 
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involve a prescriptive and categorical semantic component: i.e. many are either 
descriptive (telling us what is the case) or causal (telling us what it is necessary to do 
to get some desired result, but not telling us whether this result is desirable) in nature 
(Finnemore 1996:22-23; Florini 1996:164). (2) Norms are intersubjectively shared 
and, thus, not reducible to individual beliefs: i.e. they are to be distinguished from 
personal ideals, values, or aspirations, and they must not be equated with mere 
collections of individual beliefs about what people should do in particular kinds of 
situations even if these beliefs happen to converge; norms represent mutual 
expectations of appropriate behavior shared by a group of people (Klotz 1995:32; 
Finnemore 1996:22). (3) Norms possess "counterfactual validity," i.e. norms are not 
simple predictions, or summary descriptions, of collective behavior; rather, a given 
norm may be said to exist even as many of those whose actions it is supposed to direct 
often violate it in practice – as long as they stop short of rejecting the norm in question 
as invalid or obsolete, perceive the need to offer justifications or produce excuses for 
their deviant behavior, etc.. 
 
The effect of social norms on a state‘s foreign policy is attributed to the socialization 
processes which its foreign policy decision makers undergo. Since these agents are 
located at the interface of two social systems – international society and their 
respective domestic society –, they are simultaneously involved in two analytically 
distinct socialization processes. By virtue of their transnational socialization, foreign 
policymakers internalize value-based expectations that are shared among states and 
originate from states, intergovernmental institutions, or even international non-
governmental organizations operating as "norm entrepreneurs" (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998). International norms have a socializing effect on states‘ agents because 
the latter are concerned with maintaining a reputation not just as reliable allies or 
partners in specific instances of institutionalized cooperation (e.g., international 
regimes) but as members of international society in "good standing" (McElroy 
1992:46-53; Chayes and Chayes 1993:177; Mercer 1996). 
 
Then there is the socialization that occurs domestically. Constructivism posits that it is 
through processes of societal socialization rather than by means of public pressure 
that domestic social norms shape a state‘s foreign policymakers‘ behavior. There are 
three ways, from a constructivist point of view, that societal expectations about what 
is appropriate behavior impact on the activities of foreign policymakers. (1) As 
citizens of a country, they internalize certain social and cultural norms; (2) as 
politicians having run through national political careers, they internalize specific 
societal expectations concerning what is appropriate political behavior; and (3) in their 
desire to maintain legitimacy as the duly selected representatives of their countries in 
the international environment, they behave in ways consistent with relevant societal 
norms. 
 
 24
Within the international arena, there are both general norms, which generate identical 
value-based expectations for all states, and special norms, which apply to some states  
(e.g., the members of a regional international organization) but not to others. And 
there are norms which define different social roles for states, thus producing varied 
expectations for how these countries will act (e.g., for donor countries, on the one 
hand, and recipient countries, on the other, around issues of development). At the 
same time, there are also varying kinds of norms regarding a state’s foreign policy that 
originate in its domestic society. Among these norms, we can distinguish two groups: 
one consists of norms which directly apply to foreign policy, the other comprises 
norms which, although they regulate the internal relations of a state, affect its foreign 
policy and, consequently, have secondary effects that can be explained with reference 
to the methodological construct of the "domestic analogy." An example illustrating 
this domestic analogy, i.e. the transfer of domestic norms to foreign policy, is from 
U.S. foreign economic policy. As Anne-Marie Burley (1993) has argued, U.S. foreign 
policy in the wake of the Second World War was concerned with transferring the 
domestic practices of the New Deal to the international level. This was because U.S. 
policymakers had realized that the basic New Deal norm that the government should 
safeguard citizens' economic and social welfare by correcting market failure was not 
only valid at home, but had immediate implications for the country's world order 
policy: relying on economic openness and increased interdependence it sought to 
establish and work through international regimes which allowed governments to 
reconcile trade-stimulated growth and the provision of commensurate international 
liquidity based on stable exchange rates with the protection of basic social goals and 
expectations (including reasonable protection against external shocks) (see also 
Ruggie 1983). 
 
To summarize, in both the international arena and domestic society, there are a wealth 
of intersubjectively shared, value-based expectations of appropriate behavior that 
states seek to live up to in their foreign relations. These are the standards of behavior 
which, according to constructivism, states feel bound to adhere to in their foreign 
policy. Constructivism, thus, comes up with a conceptualization of foreign policy 
behavior which rivals both neorealism's notion of power politics and utilitarian 
liberalism's postulate of gains-seeking policy. This alternative understanding of the 
essence of foreign policy henceforth will be referred to as norm-consistent policy. 
 
5.2.  Independent Variables 
This leaves us with the question of how constructivists account for variation in states' 
foreign policy behavior, that is, with identifying what factor or factors they believe 
shape what countries do in the international arena – their independent variable(s). 
Given what we have said so far the answer is straightforward: differences in the 
behavior of states are put down to differences in the intersubjectively shared, value-
based expectations of appropriate behavior they confront as a result of pertinent 
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international and domestic norms. 
 
Historically, an important point of departure for constructivist arguments about the 
impact of norms on state behavior has been the discovery that the international (and 
domestic) practices of states are characterized by a considerable degree of 
isomorphism across a wide range of issue areas, including but not limited to the field 
of security (McNeely 1995:2-3, 20; Finnemore 1996:22). Constructivists have 
attributed this high degree of similarity in the behavior of states to the impact of 
international norms rather than to the exigencies of the security dilemma in an 
anarchical international system. Obviously, however, this isomorphism is a limited 
one; states behave differently in some ways. Constructivists have three explanations 
for this fact: First, all international norms are not global in reach. Some emerge in, and 
are restricted in their validity to, particular regional contexts, producing cross-regional 
variation in state behavior. For example, the norm that a state's system of rule has to 
be democratic and respectful of human rights and due process of law is one that is 
valid in Europe (remember EU member states' sanctions against Austria when a right-
wing party became part of the governing coalition) but not (yet) globally. Second, 
some international norms differentiate among their addressees as we have already 
noted. Finally, and perhaps most important, variation in states‘ behavior derives from 
varying domestic social norms. 
 
How do we know which norms exist in a given social context? Constructivists have 
devised procedures to identify the kinds of behavior that actors regard as appropriate 
and obligatory in a given (section of) society. Thus, norms in the international domain 
can be garnered from international law, the legal acts of international organizations, 
and the final acts of international conferences. Societal norms may be derived from 
the constitutional and legal order of the society under study, from relevant party 
programs and election platforms, and from parliamentary debates as well as from 
survey data. 
 
Whether or not a given social norm can be expected, from a constructivist point of 
view, to guide the behavior of a state in a given situation depends on its strength. Only 
norms which are sufficiently strong will affect a state's policy in the first place. 
Constructivists are well-aware that norm strength needs to be ascertained ex ante in 
order to avoid the risk of "explaining" foreign policy ex post by choosing that 
expectation of appropriate behavior from among several potentially relevant 
expectations which comes closest to the observed behavior (Legro 1997:33). The 
strength of a norm is a function of two elements. It is contingent on (1) the extent to 
which the norm is widely shared by the actors in the relevant social system ("degree of 
commonality") – the more generally accepted the norm, the better it serves as a 
predictor of behavior; and on (2) how precisely the norm defines permissible (or 
inadmissible) behavior ("degree of specificity") – the less clear it is to the actors what 
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they are expected to do or not to do, the more difficult it is for them to conform to the 
norm and presumably also the less seriously they take it.  
 
Commonality presupposes a "critical mass" within a social system of actors who share 
a particular set of values in order to reach the "tipping point" when social norms can 
be assumed to have an impact on collective behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998:901). What constitutes such a critical mass is in dispute. In a recent study on 
German foreign policy it has been argued that, in order to avoid the risk of facile 
accounts of foreign policy, no less than the vast majority of actors in the pertinent 
social system should share the expectation of appropriate behavior in question for the 
assumption of the norm exhibiting sufficient communality to be justified (Boekle et al. 
2001:109). For example, at the international level, the general prohibition of the use 
and the threat of force (as laid down in art. 2, para. 4 of the United Nations charter) is 
a norm that meets this criterion, whereas, e.g., the norm that states must intervene 
forcibly into a state that commits very serious human rights violations against its 
citizens arguably falls short of this for the time being. As to the specificity of a social 
norm, a reasonable criterion appears to be that, from among several behavioral options 
available to foreign policymakers, at least one option must be ruled out by the norm as 
clearly inappropriate. If virtually every conceivable or minimally defensible course of 
action could be regarded as consistent with the norm, the norm in question is surely 
too weak to be assumed to have a significant impact on foreign policy behavior. 
Norms which prescribe that actors "make efforts" to achieve or approach a commonly 
accepted goal (e.g. in the area of environmental protection), without setting any time 
frames or offering other criteria by which to judge "effort," may be a case in point 
(Boekle et al. 2001:109-110). 
 
Predicting the foreign policy of a state is straightforward whenever the relevant 
international and societal norms produce a clear and convergent expectation of 
appropriate behavior with respect to the state for a particular situation. Here, 
constructivist accounts of foreign policy can be said to be particularly powerful. For 
example, both international and domestic norms enjoined Germany to keep its armed 
forces integrated in NATO's military force structure after the end of the Cold War and 
unification – which it did (even though at least one version of neorealism would have 
led us to expect otherwise) (Baumann 2001:146-159). However, an expectation of 
appropriate behavior does not need to be present simultaneously at both the 
international and domestic levels for the expectation to guide foreign policymakers. If 
there is a pertinent social norm with sufficient commonality and specificity on only 
one of the two levels, the degree of its internalization by foreign policymakers (and, 
thus, its effect on their behavior) may allow a clear prediction of behavior. For 
example, at the international (here: the European) level there is no norm guiding 
Germany with respect to the issue of its net contributions to the EU budget, whereas 
there is one on the societal level, requiring that Germany increase its efforts to achieve 
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a reduction of its net payments – which it did (although some of the associated 
behavior it displayed in this context is not well explained by constructivism) (Wagner 
2001:209-220). Making a prediction becomes problematic for constructivists, 
however, when there are international and domestic norms of sufficient commonality 
and specificity which place contradictory norm-based demands on the state concerned. 
Remember the case already mentioned of the German government being torn in the 
early 1990s by conflicting expectations from its international partners and its domestic 
society with respect to Germany's participation in "out-of-area" military operations. In 
such cases, there is arguably no behavioral option open to the state which it can select 
without, in turn, violating at least one pertinent social norm. As constructivism 
assumes that states avoid inappropriate behavior, the theory is incapable of generating 
predictions regarding the foreign policy of states in such a situation. Table 2 
summarizes this discussion. 
 
Table 2: Predictive Power of Constructivist Theory 
 
international level 
 
societal level 
 
norms' 
relationship 
 
predictive power 
 
norm present 
 
norm present 
 
convergent 
 
very high 
 
norm present 
 
norm absent 
 
- 
 
high 
 
norm absent 
 
norm present 
 
- 
 
high 
 
norm present 
 
norm present 
 
contradictory 
 
nil 
 
norm absent 
 
norm absent 
 
- 
 
nil 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have looked at theories of foreign policy derived from three 
competing "schools of thought" or "paradigms" in current International Relations, viz. 
neorealism, utilitarian liberalism, and constructivism. Both neorealist and utilitarian 
liberal theories of foreign policy work from the assumption of rational actors making 
decisions based on the self-interested calculation of benefits and costs of available 
behavioral options. They differ sharply, however, with respect to the question of who 
are to be regarded as the fundamental actors of international relations and, by 
implication, of foreign policy making: for neorealism, foreign policy is the exclusive 
domain of black-boxed, unitarily acting states; utilitarian liberalism, by contrast, 
envisions states not as actors in the first place but as institutions which domestic 
societal actors (including both organized private actors and politicians and 
bureaucrats) use to further their interests at home and abroad. Constructivism breaks 
with the rationalist consensus shared by the other two theories, replacing homo 
oeconomicus with homo sociologicus and hence advocating, and building upon, an 
image of actors as norm-guided "role players" rather than "utility maximizers." In 
another respect, constructivist foreign policy occupies a middle ground between 
neorealist and utilitarian liberal theories, i.e. the level at which the most important 
sources of foreign policy behavior are located. By taking into account norms at both 
the domestic and international levels, constructivism comes down neither on the side 
of "top-down" theories (as neorealism) nor on the side of "bottom-up" theories (as 
utilitarian liberalism).  
 
Each of the three theories of foreign policy frames its dependent variable in a 
characteristic way and specifies a key explanatory variable to account for the bulk of 
variation on that variable. Neorealism conceptualizes foreign policy as power politics 
and attributes the nature and intensity of power politics states engage in at a given 
point in time, above all, to their position in a global or regional hierarchy of power 
and, secondarily, to variable external security pressures (in the case of modified 
neorealism). Utilitarian liberalism analyzes foreign policy as variations on the theme 
of "gains-seeking" and accounts for these variations by delineating the basic interests 
and foreign policy preferences of relevant societal actors and employing a policy 
network approach to identify the societal actors whose preferences are most likely to 
be reflected in the foreign policy of the country. Finally, constructivism studies 
foreign policy under the perspective of its consistency with norms, supplying a 
procedure to establish both the prescriptive content and the strength of the domestic 
and international norms that guide a given state's foreign policy choices with respect 
to some issue. Together these three theories offer the student of foreign policy a 
reasonably rich menu to choose from when he or she wishes to approach his or her 
subject matter from a theoretical point of view and, in doing so, to keep in touch with 
broader theoretical developments in the study of international relations. 
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